Is an ad hominem argument a legitimate form of philosophical argument?

Hi

That's a really interesting question. I guess we'd need to establish in what we're taking legitimacy to consist - what, in other words, is it for a form if argument to be legitimate/illegitimate? How would we determine what is, and what is not, a legitimate form of argument?

If we suppose that the purpose of philosophizing is to arrive at the truth - or at least a consistent set of beliefs - then we're going to want to measure the strength of an argument in relation to the degree of support that it affords its conclusions, and, in general, to measure the stength of an argument-form in relation to the degree of support that arguments of that form typically afford their respective conclusions.

On this proposal, we'd always find that ad hominem arguments are philosophically weak. For example, take the following:

"Fred Goodwin, that incompetent, shameless b*astard, believes that the Government should take control of this bank, so we can safely conclude that the last thing that the Government should be doing is nationalising it."

For an argument to be persuasive, its premises need either to be true, or likely to be true. The argument above concludes that the Government should not nationalise a particular bank; its premise is that Fred Goodwin thinks that the Government should. Now, construed in this way, the argument is distinctly unpersuasive: its premise affords its conclusion very little support, if indeed any at all. What, though, if we construe it as an ad hominem argument? In that case, we might read it as a two-premise argument:

(1) Fred Goodwin proposes that the Government should do P

(2) Fred Goodwin is incompetent [and a bastard :-)]

Therefore,

(3) The Government should not do P.

We've established that the argument from (1) to (3) is useless. Thus, we need (2) if our argument is to persuade, and so if (2) is false (or we have little to no reason to suppose it true), then, again, our argument affords (3) no support at all. But even if we allow that (2) is true - or at least it is reasonable for us to hold that (2) - the presumed fact that Goodwin is incompetent does not suffice to strip all his proposals of merit, and so (1) and (2), even if we have good grounds for supposing each true, do not, even together, provide us with any reason to accept (3).

From this I'd look to draw the following conclusion. In any ad hominem argument, there is what we might think of as the ad hominem premise: in the argument above, its (2).

If we remove the ad hominem premise from the argument, then the argument is either persuasive or non-persuasive. If it's persuasive without the ad hominem premise, then this premise is superfluous: the argument does not rest on this premise, and so the ad hominem formulation of the argument is defunct. If it's not peruasive without the ad hominem premise, then the question becomes: can an ad hominem premise - that a particular person has a particular characteristic, holds a particular belief, has been convicted of a particular offence, for example - turn an unpersuasive argument into a peruasive one? In most cases, I'd say that it can't: the fact that x believes that P, say, does not, even if P is clearly false, give us reason to believe, on the ground that x holds it, that Q is false, UNLESS P and Q are very closely connected (for example: if P is false, it might be far more likely that Q is false than that Q is true).

However, suppose it is claimed that almost everything that x says is false, and then concluded, on the basis that x says that P, that not-P. In this case, if the claim about x's almost always being wrong is true (or well-supported by the evidence), then the argument from her believing that P to P's being false is strong: if the claim on which it rests is true, then there is a good chance that its conclusion will be true, too.

So, I'd conclude that ad hominem arguments that make particular claims about a person - for example, about a particular belief that she holds, a particular aspect of her personality, or a particular deed that she has done - are normally going to be unpersuasive (unless the "ad hominem" premise on which such an argument turns is highly relevant to the truth-value of its conclusion); but perhaps ad hominem arguments that make general claims about a person can be peruasive: just as an argument of the form 'A1 is red; A2 is red ... A100 is red; therefore, all As are red' becomes stronger with each red A that is observed, perhaps ad hominem arguments become stronger as more "ad hominem" premises are added to them (for example, as more claims about a person's character are made, or more of her beliefs - which, let us suppose, can easily be shown to be false - are ascertained).

Your question really is very interesting and I'm sure that there's a lot more that one could say in response to it :-)

Thank you :-)

No it's not a legitimate form of philosophical argument. Which is why it's a fallacy.

Even if the claims that x is stupid, x is a child rapist, x is a hypocrite, etc, were true. It is still fallacious to use that in argument, because it simply attacks the giver of the argument and not the actual argument itself, which is what matters.

Suppose Einstein told you that the sun was black and that pigs could fly. Would that make it true? Suppose that Hitler told you that the sky looked blue and that water was wet. Would that make it untrue?

Which is the point. Who it is that says something has no impact on whether something is true or not. So anything you say about the person who makes an argument should really be irrelevant.

People do make ad hominem arguments a lot not because they are logical arguments to make, but because they are rhetorically effective. If you hate the person who is speaking, if you think he is incompetent and makes bad choices, then you are probably less likely to give his ideas a fair hearing. Humans are emotional as well as rational beings, after all.

Not a question. But quite silly, nonetheless, because you are being argumentative about classification. The unknown argument is, or is not, trifold(!): ad hominem, legitimate (or not), and philosophical (deductive error). File this one under "Arguments about Arguments".

*Addendum. I'm sailing to Jakarta on the hot wind provided by Joanne! Rainbows, lollipops, and puppy dogs!

Well you could argue that all arguments (whether or not based on fact or evidence) are ad hominem in nature? Logical or rational arguments can still paradoxically be made through a position of personal consideration (consciously or subconsciously)

Interesting question....still thinking about it

possibly in case you oppose Israeli violence yet do no longer oppose terrorist violence you're no longer antisemitic purely undeniable anti-Israel. infrequently any questioner has condemned the Hamas rocket firing, purely the answerers seem to do this. for this reason you may purely assume that those individuals are professional-Hamas. Hamas are avowed anti-Semites;- they desire to kill all Jews hence except you condemn the two facets you're, ipso facto, antisemitic. QED