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After its receipt he predicted German operations in the Balkans as a prelude to the “real drive” on Russia. The war would then come to a climax in an “ocean of anarchy and bloodshed.”

Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., who dealt with intelligence matters, reflected the indecisiveness promoted by the reports. Before the first report he thought a German-Russian deal dividing Turkey the most likely possibility.

The two reports indicated a distinct and rising possibility of a German attack on Russia but they failed to reveal that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union unconditionally and had set aside the invasion of England.

Roosevelt soaked up facts, taking particular interest in reports of German and Japanese war resources and American production figures.

President Roosevelt was keenly interested in improvement. He authorized a separate agency for intelligence in June 1941, but it needed time to establish itself and contributed little that year.

In 1941 the United States government had only a meager ability to coordinate and effectively evaluate the rising tide of information from abroad.

Roosevelt went about these problems with his distinctive decision-making style. Never given to formal bureaucratic ways, he dealt with officials in terms of competence and function rather than hierarchical position, as well as the relative importance of a particular policy domain and his interest in it.

Roosevelt soaked up facts, taking particular interest in reports of German and Japanese war resources and American production figures.

Change came slowly or not at all: both the president and Stimson wished to replace the army’s chief of military intelligence, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, but he hung on past Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt was keenly interested in improvement. He authorized a separate agency for intelligence in June 1941, but it needed time to establish itself and contributed little that year.

In 1941 the United States government had only a meager ability to coordinate and effectively evaluate the rising tide of information from abroad.

Roosevelt went about these problems with his distinctive decision-making style. Never given to formal bureaucratic ways, he dealt with officials in terms of competence and function rather than hierarchical position, as well as the relative importance of a particular policy domain and his interest in it.

This was the same type of destroyer exchanged for bases with the British in 1940, the same that still in March 1941 composed most of the destroyer force of the Atlantic Fleet.

Of course naval affairs had always aroused Roosevelt’s keenest interest. Over the mantelpiece in the Oval Study hung a painting of the four-stack destroyer Dyer on which he had traveled to Europe as assistant secretary of the navy in World War I

His closest involvement was in regulating, as commander in chief, the strength, dispositions, and rules of engagement of the United States Atlantic Fleet.

Roosevelt went about these problems with his distinctive decision-making style. Never given to formal bureaucratic ways, he dealt with officials in terms of competence and function rather than hierarchical position, as well as the relative importance of a particular policy domain and his interest in it.

According to the flag lieutenant to Admiral Harold Stark, chief of naval operations, the president would phone frequently to say, “Betty {Stark’s nickname from Naval Academy days}, I want this done right away,” and then rattle off a list of five or six assignments.

This was the same type of destroyer exchanged for bases with the British in 1940, the same that still in March 1941 composed most of the destroyer force of the Atlantic Fleet.